Wednesday, December 23, 2009
Essay Reprinted in German Business Magazine
A German business magazine, Insight Asia-Pacific, has reprinted the essay that I wrote for Global Asia, "A Skeptical View of Asia's Rise." I can't seem to access it online, but you can access the first few pages of the issue here.
Monday, November 16, 2009
Short Article on Obama's Trip to Asia
Here's a short (unpublished) article that I wrote before Obama went to Asia:
A major criticism of the Bush administration was that its focus on counterterrorism prevented it from addressing many challenges that were of equal or greater importance to the international community. Perceptions of “strategic drift” in Washington were particularly strong in Asia.
Recent developments underline the importance of reversing them through sustained engagement.
Speaking at the recent summit of Asian leaders in Thailand, Japan’s Prime Minister stated his intention to “promote regional cooperation in East Asia with a long-term vision of forming an East Asian Community.” Two weeks earlier, after affirming the importance of the Japanese-American alliance, he noted his desire “to develop policies that focus more on Asia.” His statements come at a time when Japan, China, and South Korea – Asia’s first-, second-, and fifth-largest economies, respectively – are exploring the possibility of forming a regional trade pact.
Some disclaimers are in order. Asian leaders acknowledge that it will be a long time before they can achieve an EU-style bloc, if ever. Deeply-rooted tensions and intraregional differences in governance systems and development levels pose significant obstacles. Furthermore, although Asian countries are proactively strengthening economic ties with one another, deepening economic integration is far less challenging than articulating a pan-Asian vision. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ recent survey of strategic elites in nine Asian countries, there is “[a widespread] lack of confidence that regional institutions are currently well suited to tackle many, if not most, of the likely major challenges facing Asia in the next 10 years”; “little certainty at all about how best to utilize regional institutions to promote good governance, transparency, and the rule of law”; and “no consensus” on which countries should be members of an Asian community.
Nonetheless, Washington should be attuned to the discussions between major Asian countries on achieving greater strategic unity.
It should also find ways to reassure longstanding Asian allies about the reliability of America’s security commitments (although, as Ted Galen Carpenter has argued, highly public declarations of such assurances may not be the most prudent). With the US set to transfer wartime operational command for combined defenses to South Korea in 2012, growing numbers of South Korean analysts doubt that Washington would be able to defend it in the case of a North Korean attack. Perhaps more surprisingly, Japan has cited Pyongyang’s provocations as an important reason for revisiting its nuclear taboo. Extending beyond Asia proper, a recent white paper by Australia’s Defense Department concluded that “any diminution in the willingness or capacity of the United States to act as a stabilizing force” would have “a profound effect” on its strategic situation.
Complicating the Obama administration’s outlook is that Asia is more in flux today than it has been for most of this decade. The Bush administration was tasked primarily with addressing China’s rise, resulting in the “responsible stakeholder” framework that endures through the present. Japan confronted economic stagnation and political gridlock, and South Korea devoted significant energy to containing the threat of a nuclearized Korean peninsula. Today, however, both countries are poised to reassert themselves in regional politics. With new leadership in place, Japan is looking to develop a more balanced relationship with Washington. South Korea, for its part, is enjoying newfound stature, with Ban Ki-moon launching an ambitious campaign to address climate change as Secretary-General of the UN. It recently signed a free-trade agreement with the European Union, and it will be hosting next year’s G-20 summit. India has rebounded impressively from the financial crisis, and seeks to challenge China regionally and globally. Adding to the mix is Indonesia, whose rising profile has compelled some to call for a “BRIIC” (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, and China).
Although the Obama administration has rightly prioritized and strengthened the US-China relationship, it should craft a more holistic Asia strategy that takes into account the above dynamics. The president will have a good opportunity to get started with his Asia tour next month. In addition to attending next month’s APEC summit, he is slated to meet with the leaders of ASEAN, in what the White House is calling the first formal dialogue between an American diplomat and the ten-country organization.
Beyond such details, broader geopolitical currents favor a more comprehensive American engagement. For starters, Asian countries generally welcome a robust American role in the region. Even as global opinion of American foreign policy plummeted during the Bush administration, their sentiments did not decline nearly as precipitously. Furthermore, while China’s neighbors want to share in the economic benefits that come with its ascent, they have little desire to “choose” between China and the US. Finally, America’s absolute influence in Asia remains impressive. In fact, a recent survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 69% of Chinese, 75% of Indonesians, 76% of South Koreans, and 79% of Japanese believe that American influence in Asia has actually increased in the past decade.
It would be mistaken, however, for the Obama administration to take these realities as an invitation to complacence. Rather, they should be seen as providing the US time and space to respond prudently to an Asia that is increasingly confident and dynamic.
A major criticism of the Bush administration was that its focus on counterterrorism prevented it from addressing many challenges that were of equal or greater importance to the international community. Perceptions of “strategic drift” in Washington were particularly strong in Asia.
Recent developments underline the importance of reversing them through sustained engagement.
Speaking at the recent summit of Asian leaders in Thailand, Japan’s Prime Minister stated his intention to “promote regional cooperation in East Asia with a long-term vision of forming an East Asian Community.” Two weeks earlier, after affirming the importance of the Japanese-American alliance, he noted his desire “to develop policies that focus more on Asia.” His statements come at a time when Japan, China, and South Korea – Asia’s first-, second-, and fifth-largest economies, respectively – are exploring the possibility of forming a regional trade pact.
Some disclaimers are in order. Asian leaders acknowledge that it will be a long time before they can achieve an EU-style bloc, if ever. Deeply-rooted tensions and intraregional differences in governance systems and development levels pose significant obstacles. Furthermore, although Asian countries are proactively strengthening economic ties with one another, deepening economic integration is far less challenging than articulating a pan-Asian vision. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ recent survey of strategic elites in nine Asian countries, there is “[a widespread] lack of confidence that regional institutions are currently well suited to tackle many, if not most, of the likely major challenges facing Asia in the next 10 years”; “little certainty at all about how best to utilize regional institutions to promote good governance, transparency, and the rule of law”; and “no consensus” on which countries should be members of an Asian community.
Nonetheless, Washington should be attuned to the discussions between major Asian countries on achieving greater strategic unity.
It should also find ways to reassure longstanding Asian allies about the reliability of America’s security commitments (although, as Ted Galen Carpenter has argued, highly public declarations of such assurances may not be the most prudent). With the US set to transfer wartime operational command for combined defenses to South Korea in 2012, growing numbers of South Korean analysts doubt that Washington would be able to defend it in the case of a North Korean attack. Perhaps more surprisingly, Japan has cited Pyongyang’s provocations as an important reason for revisiting its nuclear taboo. Extending beyond Asia proper, a recent white paper by Australia’s Defense Department concluded that “any diminution in the willingness or capacity of the United States to act as a stabilizing force” would have “a profound effect” on its strategic situation.
Complicating the Obama administration’s outlook is that Asia is more in flux today than it has been for most of this decade. The Bush administration was tasked primarily with addressing China’s rise, resulting in the “responsible stakeholder” framework that endures through the present. Japan confronted economic stagnation and political gridlock, and South Korea devoted significant energy to containing the threat of a nuclearized Korean peninsula. Today, however, both countries are poised to reassert themselves in regional politics. With new leadership in place, Japan is looking to develop a more balanced relationship with Washington. South Korea, for its part, is enjoying newfound stature, with Ban Ki-moon launching an ambitious campaign to address climate change as Secretary-General of the UN. It recently signed a free-trade agreement with the European Union, and it will be hosting next year’s G-20 summit. India has rebounded impressively from the financial crisis, and seeks to challenge China regionally and globally. Adding to the mix is Indonesia, whose rising profile has compelled some to call for a “BRIIC” (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, and China).
Although the Obama administration has rightly prioritized and strengthened the US-China relationship, it should craft a more holistic Asia strategy that takes into account the above dynamics. The president will have a good opportunity to get started with his Asia tour next month. In addition to attending next month’s APEC summit, he is slated to meet with the leaders of ASEAN, in what the White House is calling the first formal dialogue between an American diplomat and the ten-country organization.
Beyond such details, broader geopolitical currents favor a more comprehensive American engagement. For starters, Asian countries generally welcome a robust American role in the region. Even as global opinion of American foreign policy plummeted during the Bush administration, their sentiments did not decline nearly as precipitously. Furthermore, while China’s neighbors want to share in the economic benefits that come with its ascent, they have little desire to “choose” between China and the US. Finally, America’s absolute influence in Asia remains impressive. In fact, a recent survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 69% of Chinese, 75% of Indonesians, 76% of South Koreans, and 79% of Japanese believe that American influence in Asia has actually increased in the past decade.
It would be mistaken, however, for the Obama administration to take these realities as an invitation to complacence. Rather, they should be seen as providing the US time and space to respond prudently to an Asia that is increasingly confident and dynamic.
Sunday, November 8, 2009
"Look More Closely at India" (Old Publication)
"Look More Closely at India," The Korea Times (August 15, 2006)*
India's economy brims with energy. But any discussion of its promise must come alongside an acknowledgment of its peril.
* Postscript forthcoming.
India's economy brims with energy. But any discussion of its promise must come alongside an acknowledgment of its peril.
* Postscript forthcoming.
Sunday, October 25, 2009
"Balance of Power Key to U.S.-China Relations"
"Balance of Power Key to U.S.-China Relations," World Politics Review (October 22, 2009)
The form that US-China cooperation takes will depend considerably on the balance of power between the two countries.
The form that US-China cooperation takes will depend considerably on the balance of power between the two countries.
"A Skeptical View of Asia's Rise"
"A Skeptical View of Asia's Rise," Global Asia, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Fall 2009): pp. 50-52
There are important reasons to bet against an "Asian century" that manifests itself in the emergence of an Asia-Pacific or East Asian Community.
There are important reasons to bet against an "Asian century" that manifests itself in the emergence of an Asia-Pacific or East Asian Community.
"Worldwise: The Asian Century"
"Worldwise: The Asian Century," discussion on Bloggingheads.tv (September 7, 2009)
Parag Khanna and I discuss whether or not an "Asian century" is likely to materialize.
Parag Khanna and I discuss whether or not an "Asian century" is likely to materialize.
"Should Pakistan Prosecute Musharraf?"
"Should Pakistan Prosecute Musharraf?" The Christian Science Monitor (September 2, 2009)
Targeting only Pervez Musharraf for violating Pakistan's constitution would be unfair, but going after all guilty parties would destabilize the country. Parliament may just have to let the past be the past.
Targeting only Pervez Musharraf for violating Pakistan's constitution would be unfair, but going after all guilty parties would destabilize the country. Parliament may just have to let the past be the past.
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