Quick Takes on Global Issues

Welcome Address at this Year's St. Gallen Symposium

2011-05-17T09:04:00.000-07:00

I had the opportunity to deliver a welcome address at this year's St. Gallen Symposium, whose theme was "just power." Any reactions that you might have would be much appreciated.

Review of Ian Bremmer's New Book

2010-05-18T15:45:00.000-07:00

Below is a review that I wrote of Ian Bremmer's new book, The End of the Free Market.
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Although there was certainly no dearth of commentary about the rise of China and the appeal of "The Beijing Consensus" prior to the global financial crisis, such discussion has exploded in its aftermath. While the United States coped with the most serious challenge to its economy -- and the intellectual underpinnings thereof -- since the 1930s, China lamented that its economy "only" grew by 8.7% in 2009. The marked performance gap between the world's lone superpower and its putative successor has, understandably, generated an intense debate about the performance and sustainability of democratic capitalism.

Prolific political-risk expert Ian Bremmer joins this discussion with an important contribution.

In an interview with Nouriel Roubini, he defines state capitalism as "a system in which the state uses the power of markets primarily for political gain." Although it is neither new nor a uniquely Chinese phenomenon, it is also true, as Bremmer notes, that "we wouldn't be talking about state capitalism as [a] game-changer for international politics and the global economy if it weren't for China."

The state-capitalist challenge appears to loom especially large when juxtaposed with the developed world's anemic recovery from the crisis. Indeed, one could argue that it is precisely those three places that were considered the anchors of the global economy at the turn of the century -- the US, Western Europe, and Japan -- that have struggled most in the past year. Although sobering, that reality also suggests grounds for optimism: state capitalism poses a challenge because the underlying ideology of market-based capitalism has sustained such a serious blow, not because it is intrinsically more appealing.

Indeed, it would be mistaken to view state capitalism as an ideology for at least two reasons:

(1) Although there are increasingly robust commercial and strategic ties between its principal practitioners -- China, Russia, and Arab countries in the Persian Gulf -- those countries have yet to coalesce into an ideological front of the kind that the West encountered in the Soviet Union and its satellite network.

(2) Its exponents are far more concerned with advancing their interests than with exporting what amounts to a management system.

Consider China, state capitalism's de facto, if reluctant, spokesperson. The impressiveness with which its global imprint is growing belies the reality that its overarching goal is to maintain internal stability. Achieving that objective requires robust economic growth, which, given the size of its population, requires it to undertake extraordinarily ambitious campaigns abroad to secure vital commodities. Most commentary adduces the scale and shrewdness of those campaigns as evidence of an exportable model, even though they are better interpreted as demonstrating how daunting it is to maintain authoritarian rule over such a vast, increasingly empowered citizenry.

Indeed, it is somewhat ironic to speak of a China "model" since China could well be the world's most inimitable country. In a recent essay, "The Geography of Chinese Power," Robert Kaplan observes that it "combines an extreme, Western-style modernity with a 'hydraulic civilization'," making it "relentlessly dynamic in ways that democracies, with all of their temporizing, cannot be."

Although his title might suggest a different conclusion, Bremmer predicts that market-driven capitalism will outlast its state-capitalist counterpart.

Whether or not that conclusion proves correct, it is clear that the struggle to identify the "correct" model of economic governance -- once believed to have been settled with the Cold War's conclusion -- is anything but. The US is wondering how to tame a hyperfinancialized variant of capitalism whose inner workings appear to elude even many of its chief beneficiaries. The European Union is struggling to achieve economic integration, let alone the coherent vision for foreign policy towards which it doubtless continues to aspire. And the China model, notwithstanding its seeming vitality, faces important constraints. No less than Yang Yao, a prominent Chinese intellectual, has concluded that "Popular resistance and economic imbalances are now moving China toward another major crisis. Strong and privileged interest groups and commercialized local governments are blocking equal distribution of the benefits of economic growth throughout society, thereby rendering futile the [Chinese Communist Party's] strategy of trading economic growth for people's consent to its absolute rule."

Bremmer's account offers a sobering corrective to those who have grown complacent about capitalism's staying power, but also a welcome antidote to those who regard its demise as a fait accompli. And yet, despite striking a sensible middle ground, it leaves one feeling far more uncertain about the future of the global economy and the paradigms that will steer it.

China's Rise

2010-03-14T14:11:00.000-07:00

David Ignatius’ article, “The trouble with China’s economic bubble,” inserts some welcome caution into the discussion of China’s rise.

For starters, many predictions about Chinese growth rest on questionable assumptions. Let’s assume, however, that China’s economy eventually overtakes that of the US—certainly a plausible outcome. Besides, perhaps, marking a psychological shift—the US might not act as confidently vis-à-vis China afterwards—that transition should not be regarded as consequential in and of itself. The key question is what, if anything, China will do once its output surpasses America’s. Will it use that juncture as a point of departure for undertaking revisionist foreign-policy initiatives, or will it continue to integrate itself into the postwar order?

People’s preoccupation with China’s GDP—rather, the trajectory thereof—reflects a tendency to conflate power with influence. They don’t simply move in parallel. Although there are many ways to convert the first into the second—military might, economic clout, and so forth—one that seems particularly relevant when thinking about China is the existence of an idea or ideal that captures people’s imagination. Raymond Aron argued in 1953 that “[T]he strength of a great power is diminished if it ceases to serve an idea.” With few exceptions, China’s animating principles—for example, “harmonious development” and the insistence upon noninterference in other countries’ affairs—appear intended not so much to attract others as they do to prevent others from being fearful of its rise.

Niall Ferguson's New Essay, "Complexity and Collapse"

2010-03-14T12:19:00.000-07:00

Niall Ferguson has a fascinating essay in the new issue of Foreign Affairs, “Complexity and Collapse: Empires on the Edge of Chaos.”

He argues that great powers don’t rise and fall gradually, as conventional wisdom suggests, but instead maintain a façade of stability for a long time before experiencing a swift collapse: “What if collapse does not arrive over a number of centuries but comes suddenly, like a thief in the night?” Ferguson suggests that great powers resemble “termite hill[s]” more than “Egyptian pyramid[s].”

He joins Nicholas Taleb in condemning the “narrative fallacy”: that is, contriving long series of antecedent phenomena to explain “fat tail” occurrences—for example, wars and famines—even when “the proximate triggers of a crisis are often sufficient” in doing so. Ferguson argues that fiscal crises are more often than note the culpable triggers.

He notes that a “small input”—typically a financial crisis—can cause great powers to collapse when it causes the system’s “component parts [to] lose faith in its viability.” His essay raises several questions:

— If empires indeed implode in such short, unexpected order, what purpose, if any, does long-term strategic thinking serve? Grand strategy? How can the US address increasingly long-term challenges—for example, climate change, the spread of infectious diseases, and the rise of emerging powers—if and when geopolitical tsunamis loom large?

— Although Ferguson roots most imperial collapses in fiscal crises, he subsequently notes that those crises aren’t to blame in and of themselves; rather, they’re guilty to the extent that they undermine the confidence of the system’s components. Given that great powers tend to experience numerous fiscal crises, what explains their ability to withstand—and emerge more resilient after—some, but not others? Put differently, can we identify a system’s confidence threshold, up until which its components have faith in its ability to self-correct following a fiscal crisis?

— Why do fiscal crises inspire greater doubts about a system’s durability than other fat-tail phenomena?

— Ferguson suggests that systemic risk is inbuilt into all political systems: “Regardless of whether it is a dictatorship or a democracy, any large-scale political unit is a complex system.” This proposition appears to imply a tradeoff between increasing the complexity—and, therefore, the functionality—of governance and reducing the degree of systemic risk. Is this tradeoff real, and, if so, how can it be optimized?

Essay Reprinted in German Business Magazine

2009-12-23T14:38:00.000-08:00

A German business magazine, Insight Asia-Pacific, has reprinted the essay that I wrote for Global Asia, "A Skeptical View of Asia's Rise." I can't seem to access it online, but you can access the first few pages of the issue here.

Short Article on Obama's Trip to Asia

2009-11-16T15:53:00.001-08:00

Here's a short (unpublished) article that I wrote before Obama went to Asia:

A major criticism of the Bush administration was that its focus on counterterrorism prevented it from addressing many challenges that were of equal or greater importance to the international community. Perceptions of “strategic drift” in Washington were particularly strong in Asia.

Recent developments underline the importance of reversing them through sustained engagement.

Speaking at the recent summit of Asian leaders in Thailand, Japan’s Prime Minister stated his intention to “promote regional cooperation in East Asia with a long-term vision of forming an East Asian Community.” Two weeks earlier, after affirming the importance of the Japanese-American alliance, he noted his desire “to develop policies that focus more on Asia.” His statements come at a time when Japan, China, and South Korea – Asia’s first-, second-, and fifth-largest economies, respectively – are exploring the possibility of forming a regional trade pact.

Some disclaimers are in order. Asian leaders acknowledge that it will be a long time before they can achieve an EU-style bloc, if ever. Deeply-rooted tensions and intraregional differences in governance systems and development levels pose significant obstacles. Furthermore, although Asian countries are proactively strengthening economic ties with one another, deepening economic integration is far less challenging than articulating a pan-Asian vision. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ recent survey of strategic elites in nine Asian countries, there is “[a widespread] lack of confidence that regional institutions are currently well suited to tackle many, if not most, of the likely major challenges facing Asia in the next 10 years”; “little certainty at all about how best to utilize regional institutions to promote good governance, transparency, and the rule of law”; and “no consensus” on which countries should be members of an Asian community.

Nonetheless, Washington should be attuned to the discussions between major Asian countries on achieving greater strategic unity.

It should also find ways to reassure longstanding Asian allies about the reliability of America’s security commitments (although, as Ted Galen Carpenter has argued, highly public declarations of such assurances may not be the most prudent). With the US set to transfer wartime operational command for combined defenses to South Korea in 2012, growing numbers of South Korean analysts doubt that Washington would be able to defend it in the case of a North Korean attack. Perhaps more surprisingly, Japan has cited Pyongyang’s provocations as an important reason for revisiting its nuclear taboo. Extending beyond Asia proper, a recent white paper by Australia’s Defense Department concluded that “any diminution in the willingness or capacity of the United States to act as a stabilizing force” would have “a profound effect” on its strategic situation.

Complicating the Obama administration’s outlook is that Asia is more in flux today than it has been for most of this decade. The Bush administration was tasked primarily with addressing China’s rise, resulting in the “responsible stakeholder” framework that endures through the present. Japan confronted economic stagnation and political gridlock, and South Korea devoted significant energy to containing the threat of a nuclearized Korean peninsula. Today, however, both countries are poised to reassert themselves in regional politics. With new leadership in place, Japan is looking to develop a more balanced relationship with Washington. South Korea, for its part, is enjoying newfound stature, with Ban Ki-moon launching an ambitious campaign to address climate change as Secretary-General of the UN. It recently signed a free-trade agreement with the European Union, and it will be hosting next year’s G-20 summit. India has rebounded impressively from the financial crisis, and seeks to challenge China regionally and globally. Adding to the mix is Indonesia, whose rising profile has compelled some to call for a “BRIIC” (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, and China).

Although the Obama administration has rightly prioritized and strengthened the US-China relationship, it should craft a more holistic Asia strategy that takes into account the above dynamics. The president will have a good opportunity to get started with his Asia tour next month. In addition to attending next month’s APEC summit, he is slated to meet with the leaders of ASEAN, in what the White House is calling the first formal dialogue between an American diplomat and the ten-country organization.

Beyond such details, broader geopolitical currents favor a more comprehensive American engagement. For starters, Asian countries generally welcome a robust American role in the region. Even as global opinion of American foreign policy plummeted during the Bush administration, their sentiments did not decline nearly as precipitously. Furthermore, while China’s neighbors want to share in the economic benefits that come with its ascent, they have little desire to “choose” between China and the US. Finally, America’s absolute influence in Asia remains impressive. In fact, a recent survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 69% of Chinese, 75% of Indonesians, 76% of South Koreans, and 79% of Japanese believe that American influence in Asia has actually increased in the past decade.

It would be mistaken, however, for the Obama administration to take these realities as an invitation to complacence. Rather, they should be seen as providing the US time and space to respond prudently to an Asia that is increasingly confident and dynamic.

"Balance of Power Key to U.S.-China Relations"

2009-10-25T11:10:00.001-07:00

"Balance of Power Key to U.S.-China Relations," World Politics Review (October 22, 2009)

The form that US-China cooperation takes will depend considerably on the balance of power between the two countries.

"A Skeptical View of Asia's Rise"

2009-10-25T11:06:00.001-07:00

"A Skeptical View of Asia's Rise," Global Asia, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Fall 2009): pp. 50-52

There are important reasons to bet against an "Asian century" that manifests itself in the emergence of an Asia-Pacific or East Asian Community.

"Worldwise: The Asian Century"

2009-10-25T11:04:00.000-07:00

"Worldwise: The Asian Century," discussion on Bloggingheads.tv (September 7, 2009)

Parag Khanna and I discuss whether or not an "Asian century" is likely to materialize.

"Should Pakistan Prosecute Musharraf?"

2009-10-25T11:01:00.000-07:00

"Should Pakistan Prosecute Musharraf?" The Christian Science Monitor (September 2, 2009)

Targeting only Pervez Musharraf for violating Pakistan's constitution would be unfair, but going after all guilty parties would destabilize the country. Parliament may just have to let the past be the past.

"The Chindia Illusion"

2009-10-25T10:58:00.000-07:00

"The Chindia Illusion," The National Interest (July 23, 2009)

Stripping away the unity that China and India appear to have forged by virtue of being Asia's fast-rising titans, one sees that the main dynamic between them is competition, not cooperation.

"Lessons from the Lawyers' Movement"

2009-10-25T10:55:00.000-07:00

"Lessons from the Lawyers' Movement," The Washington Post's blog, PostGlobal (July 10, 2009)

There was widespread agreement within and outside of Pakistan that Iftikhar Chaudhry's reinstatement as chief justice marked the beginning - albeit fragile and uncertain - of the country's democratization. In reality, however, it reaffirmed the need for basic principles to inform Pakistan's political development.

"Connecting Tiananmen and Tehran"

2009-10-25T10:51:00.000-07:00

"Connecting Tiananmen and Tehran," The Globalist (July 14, 2009)

The key insight from Beijing's post-Tiananmen experience - that a country that is more integrated into the world economy has to pay more attention to its human-rights record - is very relevant to Tehran.

"A Humanitarian Assessment of the War in Iraq"

2009-10-25T10:45:00.000-07:00

"A Humanitarian Assessment of the War in Iraq," Carnegie Ethics Online (July 7, 2009)

It is not only the case that one should not assess a war's success solely on the extent to which strategic objectives have been achieved. It is also evident that, in the case of Iraq, one cannot do so.

"Fixing the Odds"

2009-10-25T10:41:00.000-07:00

"Fixing the Odds," with Minxin Pei, The International Herald Tribune (June 25, 2009): p. 9

In reviewing 16 cases of rigged elections in authoritarian or transition countries in the last 40 years, we concluded that autocratic rulers who attempted to steal presidential, parliamentary, or general elections had a roughly equal chance of keeping their grip on power, succumbing to a quick and decisive defeat, or getting mired in a costly political stalemate.

"Are States Still Relevant?"

2009-10-24T14:45:00.000-07:00

"Are States Still Relevant?" The Globalist, April 27, 2009

There is no question that the state is in a rough spot as a result of the global financial crisis. Intuition suggests, however, that it only grows more relevant in times of uncertainty.

"Signs of Strategic Recalibration in China"

2009-10-24T14:41:00.001-07:00

"Signs of Strategic Recalibration in China," World Politics Review, April 21, 2009

China is using the global financial crisis to step back and consider how it can rise in a more sustainable manner. That move is borne not only of a desire to be a world power, but also of its recognition that its strategy of roughly the past three decades - grow rapidly, worry about the consequences later - is no longer viable.

"A Freer China Would Stimulate Spending"

2009-10-24T14:35:00.000-07:00

"A Freer China Would Stimulate Spending," with Minxin Pei, The Financial Times (April 6, 2009): p. 13

To rekindle growth, Beijing needs more than just an economic stimulus; it must give its people a voice so that they are free to consume.

Analysis of the surge of American troops into Iraq

2009-10-24T14:31:00.001-07:00

Analysis of the surge of American troops into Iraq, Foreign Policy (March 31, 2009)*

The dichotomous debate over Iraq - one side supports (even if tacitly) indefinite occupation on the grounds that a full-scale civil war will erupt if the United States withdraws prematurely; the other supports a phased withdrawal of American troops from Iraq on the grounds that the occupation is increasingly a strategic liability - excludes moral considerations.

* This article wasn't an article per se, but rather, an extended comment that Tom Ricks published on one of his blog posts.

"Public Opinion and Power"

2009-10-24T14:19:00.001-07:00

"Public Opinion and Power," The Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (London: Routledge, 2008): pp. 39-49*

World public opinion is limiting the United States' ability to exercise influence abroad.

* Pages 43 and 44 aren't available through the link, so please e-mail me if you'd like to see the full chapter.

* In retrospect, I should probably have opted for the title "Public Opinion and Influence." Although it's true that opposition to American foreign policy derives in part from fear and / or resentment of U.S. power, there are many other variables that shape its level and intensity. See the American Political Science Association's report, U.S. Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future, for a treatment of some of them.

"In Pakistan, Optimism Proves Unwarranted"

2009-10-24T14:14:00.000-07:00

"In Pakistan, Optimism Proves Unwarranted," The Boston Globe (November 11, 2008): p. A15

Unity that derives from opposition alone - in this case, to Pervez Musharraf - is unsustainable. Although his opponents successfully brought him down, they have yet to articulate ideas for how to move Pakistan forward.

Book Review

2009-10-24T14:10:00.000-07:00

Review of The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World's Government in the Twenty-First Century (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005), Political Studies Review, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September 2007): p. 451

By neglecting important nuances and disregarding contradictory evidence, this book does not help us understand why the United States' actions have fallen into such great disrepute.

"Examining the Declining Utility of Military Force"

2009-10-24T14:07:00.000-07:00

"Examining the Declining Utility of Military Force," Human Rights and Human Welfare, Vol. 6 (June 2006): pp. 119-35

The utility of conventional military force is declining even as respect for militarism as a central instrument of statecraft is growing in the United States.

"Questioning Hegemonic Continuum"

2009-10-24T14:04:00.000-07:00

"Questioning Hegemonic Continuum," American Diplomacy, March 13, 2006

Important trends suggest that the end of the United States' reign atop the world may well conclude the era in which a superpower necessarily prevails.

The Purpose of this Blog

2009-10-24T13:36:00.000-07:00

I plan on using this space to offer my take on various foreign-policy topics, and will begin by sharing some of the work that I've done. Ideally, though, it'll become a hub of discussion and debate on those issues, so please feel free to send me any suggestions that you might have on how it can serve that purpose.