China's Rise

David Ignatius’ article, “The trouble with China’s economic bubble,” inserts some welcome caution into the discussion of China’s rise.

For starters, many predictions about Chinese growth rest on questionable assumptions. Let’s assume, however, that China’s economy eventually overtakes that of the US—certainly a plausible outcome. Besides, perhaps, marking a psychological shift—the US might not act as confidently vis-à-vis China afterwards—that transition should not be regarded as consequential in and of itself. The key question is what, if anything, China will do once its output surpasses America’s. Will it use that juncture as a point of departure for undertaking revisionist foreign-policy initiatives, or will it continue to integrate itself into the postwar order?

People’s preoccupation with China’s GDP—rather, the trajectory thereof—reflects a tendency to conflate power with influence. They don’t simply move in parallel. Although there are many ways to convert the first into the second—military might, economic clout, and so forth—one that seems particularly relevant when thinking about China is the existence of an idea or ideal that captures people’s imagination. Raymond Aron argued in 1953 that “[T]he strength of a great power is diminished if it ceases to serve an idea.” With few exceptions, China’s animating principles—for example, “harmonious development” and the insistence upon noninterference in other countries’ affairs—appear intended not so much to attract others as they do to prevent others from being fearful of its rise.